Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Prologue (G. Bamberg and K. Spremann) -- Section 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing -- Agent and Principal (D. Spremann) -- Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information (H. Milde) -- Risk Sharing and Subcontracting (G. Bamberg) -- -- Section 2. Information and Incentives -- Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems (V. Firchau) -- Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts -- Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public -- Incentives to Forecast Honestly (A. Pfingsten) -- -- Section 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard -- Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues -- The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem -- On Stakeholders`Unanimity (J. E. M. Wilhelm) -- -- Section 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends -- Signalling and Market Behavior (A. Gruber) -- Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information -- Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual -- -- Section 5. External Accounting and Auditing -- The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting (R. Ewert) -- Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation (F. Fricke) -- Auditing in an Agency Setting (W. Ballwieser) -- Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information (A. Wagenhofer) -- -- Section 6. Coordination in Groups -- Managers as Principals and Agents (M. J. Beckmann) -- Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations (M. Gaynor and P. R. Kleindorfer) -- Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach -- -- Section 7. Property Rights and Fairness -- Mangerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm (T. Kaulmann) -- Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making (E. Schanze -- A Note on Fair Equality of Rules (J. Voeller) -- -- Section 8. Agency Costs -- Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets -- Agency Costs are not a "Flop"! (R. H. Schmidt) -- -- About Contributors -- Author Index -- Subject Index