|
|
1.
|
Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives by
- Spremann, Klaus [Editor]
- Ballwieser, W [Colaborador]
- Bamberg, Günter [Colaborador]
- Beckmann, Martin [Colaborador]
- Besters, H [Colaborador]
- Blickle, M [Colaborador]
- Ewert, R [Colaborador]
- Feichtinger, Gustav [Colaborador]
- Firchau, Volker [Colaborador]
- Fricke, F [Colaborador]
- Funke, H [Colaborador]
- Gaynor, Martín [Colaborador]
- Gruber, A [Colaborador]
- Hartmann-Wendels, T [Colaborador]
- Hellwig, M [Colaborador]
- Kaulmann, T [Colaborador]
- Kleindorfer, P. R [Colaborador]
- Krahnen, J. P [Colaborador]
- Meran, G [Colaborador]
- Milde, H [Colaborador]
- Pfingsten, A [Colaborador]
- Schanze, E [Colaborador]
- Schmidt, R. H [Colaborador]
- Schneider, D [Colaborador]
- Sorger, G [Colaborador]
- Swoboda, P [Colaborador]
- Voeller, J [Colaborador]
- Wagenhofer, A [Colaborador]
- Wilhelm, J. E. M [Colaborador]
- Bamberg, Günter [Editor]
Material type:  Text; Format:
large print
regular print
Publication details: Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 1989
Availability: Items available for reference: Biblioteca Fac.Ciencias Económicas: Consulta en Sala (1)Call number: PHL 330.101 AGE.
|