Incentives and Political Economy

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Clarendon Lectures in EconomicsPublication details: New York : Oxford University Press, 2001Description: xii, 257 pISBN:
  • 0199248680
Subject(s):
Contents:
Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- I. Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- 2. The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- 3. An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- 4. Checks and Balances -- II. Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- 5. Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- 6. Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy -- 7. Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation -- III. Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design -- 8. Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation -- 9. Collusion and Decentralization -- 10. Concluding Remarks -- Appendix. Translations of Passages Quoted in French -- References -- Index
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode
Libros Libros Biblioteca Fac.Ciencias Económicas 330.101 LAF (i) (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Consulta en Sala DEO-LIB-51932

Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- I. Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- 2. The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- 3. An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- 4. Checks and Balances -- II. Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- 5. Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- 6. Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy -- 7. Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation -- III. Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design -- 8. Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation -- 9. Collusion and Decentralization -- 10. Concluding Remarks -- Appendix. Translations of Passages Quoted in French -- References -- Index

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